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ISLAMISM AND REGIME CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA: LOOKING BEYOND THE ARAB UPRISINGS 
 
By Ewan Stein and Frédéric Volpi1 
 
In the three and a half years since the popular uprising in Tunisia inaugurated the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’, new political dynamics have been unleashed across the Middle 
East and North Africa. In four countries—Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen—sitting 
rulers were deposed, leading to some form of regime change. In each case Islamist 
movements sought, in different ways, to fill the void. Initially, as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Ennahda surged into prominence in Egypt and Tunisia respectively, 
the star of political Islam seemed to be on an unstoppable rise. The Islah Party, main 
vehicle of the Brothers in Yemen, moved to centre stage in the wake of president 
Saleh’s departure. The Muslim Brotherhood’s less than decisive electoral showing in 
Libya did not much detract from the overall impression that across the region a new 
era of Islamism was dawning. Islamism, it suddenly seemed, may not only be 
compatible with democratisation but could act as a potential catalyst for it in the Arab 
world. 
Islamism was also reappraised with fresh eyes as Western audiences, perhaps 
for the first time, encountered well-spoken and reasonable sounding representatives of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda and other groups, as well as tech-savvy Islamist 
youth. This marked a sea change in the prevailing policy and media discourse of 
demonization and fear that had surrounded political Islam in the decade following the 
11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. If there was a warming of attitudes to 
political Islam in Western policy circles, however, many of the region’s more secular 
actors felt abandoned by the West. In Egypt and Tunisia in particular, the electoral 
success of Islamist parties was met with deep foreboding. A seemingly irreconcilable 
schism between Islamists and secularists paralysed political life in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Matters came to a head with the fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt. Riding a wave of 
popular discontent, the military turned on the Brotherhood and its supporters. Anti-
Islamists figures in civil society and the media reverted to the discourse of the war on 
terror. The Muslim Brotherhood, according to this narrative, was a terrorist group, 
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and all those who associated themselves with it were also terrorists or apologists for 
terrorism. Reconciliation and compromise were no longer on the table.  
Western attitudes towards Islamist parties mellowed as the reality of their 
political ascendance became evident in the wake of the uprisings. As a result, the anti-
Islamist hysteria emanating from Egypt, and encouraged for tactical reasons by some 
Gulf states, is received with more scepticism today than it was before the Arab 
uprisings. Nonetheless, the reaction of Western democracies to the military’s 
counterrevolution in Egypt has been timid and at times incoherent. While the Obama 
administration has criticised the relapse into authoritarianism, its overall response has 
been muted. The new and complex political re-articulations of Islamism across the 
region after the uprisings has created policy dilemmas for the international 
community, and many international players have been returning by default to the 
familiar territory of demonising Islamism. 
Prompted by the military coup in Egypt, the continuing lack of stable and 
working state institutions in Libya and Yemen, and the disappointing socio-economic 
improvements in Tunisia, a feeling of disenchantment with ‘regime change’ has set in 
across the region for Islamists and other political actors alike. Instead of having a 
virtuous circle of political change created by collaboration between international 
actors, Islamist and non-Islamist political actors, and the citizens of the region, 
vicious circles of authoritarianism and violence are regaining momentum as a 
consequence of the actions of a few political actors opposed to democratic change. 
Developments in the Middle East and North Africa since the uprisings began 
have revealed, more clearly than ever, that political Islam is not a unitary 
phenomenon. The types of political and social activism that are often unthinkingly 
categorised as ‘Islamist’ are many and are not all aiming to achieve the same goals. 
To counter overly simplistic or misleading analyses of Islamism, and to provide 
clarity to the process of policy making, the contributions to this report differentiate 
between three different forms (or levels) of Islamist activism—political, grassroots 
and violent activism—in order to map the evolution of Islamist actors beyond the 
Arab uprisings. 
Islamist political activism 
 
Political activism refers to institutionalised participation within the context of the 
existing order. While recognising that ‘the political’ extends deeper than the state 
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level, for clarity we distinguish this level of activism by its connection with formal 
politics at the national level. In Egypt the exemplar of Islamist political activism prior 
to the fall of Mubarak was the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in 
electoral politics since 1984. In Tunisia, Ennahda—suppressed after the partial 
democratic opening of the late 1980s—nevertheless called for democratic reform 
during its years in exile and clandestinity. In Yemen, the Islah Party represented the 
main manifestation of national-level Islamist coalition politics. At the opposite end of 
the participative spectrum, Ghaddafi’s Libya offered no scope for political expression, 
Islamist or otherwise, even though in the 2000s moves toward reconciliation were 
afoot between the Brotherhood and the regime.  
Political contestation in the Arab world in the last 30 years has been 
increasingly articulated and demarcated via the language of religion, not least due to 
the fact that opportunities for political dissent were blocked. Authoritarian regimes 
often encouraged Islamist parties in order to undermine the ideological leadership of 
left-wing actors, but then curtailed their activities in high politics. In Egypt, Islamist 
parliamentary activists engaged with a range of mundane social policies and 
committee work but tended to stop short of frontal opposition to the regime, which 
would be to invite repression. As such, debate and disagreement within the public 
sphere increasingly revolved around the role of religion in public life and pitted 
‘Islamists’ against ‘secularists’. 
The Arab uprisings, even in opening up political systems, have not as yet 
enabled political debate to transcend the previously demarcated boundaries. If 
anything, the schism between Islamists and secularists appears to be widening. This is 
reflected in competing narratives of the uprisings (or ‘revolutions’) themselves. For 
many Islamists, secular parties are tainted by their previous dependence on and 
complicity with the old regimes, and are thus inherently counterrevolutionary. 
Established secular actors and newer protest movements, conversely, ascribe 
authoritarian and ‘theocratic’ tendencies to Islamists, and also point to the 
opportunistic collusion that existed between Islamist groups and regimes. Today, the 
fact that the conflict between Islamists and secularists seems not to be abating, 
particularly in Egypt but also in Tunisia, and in different ways in Libya and Yemen, 
suggests that despite regime change, meaningful political debate is still very 
constrained by this authoritarian legacy. 
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In the 1990s and 2000s, the ‘moderation’ of Islamists, which necessitated the 
abandonment or postponement of revolutionary goals (not least the overthrow of 
corrupt regimes and the construction of just Islamic societies ruled according to 
shariʿa) appealed to middle class constituencies benefiting from the status quo, but 
left many of their more downtrodden followers dissatisfied. If one of the main 
successes of institutionalised Islamist activism after the Arab uprisings was to 
illustrate that it could become a ‘normal’ form of political activism in a multiparty 
system, one of its main failures was to show to the disenfranchised who had hoped for 
a radical transformation of their life that Islamist parties were perhaps no better than 
other political parties. This helps explain the increased salience, following the 
revolutions, of other modalities of Islamist activism: grassroots and violent activism. 
 
Grassroots Islamist activism 
 
Grassroots activism denotes ‘apolitical’ or ‘infra-political’ local-level organisational, 
preaching and charitable activity. Grassroots activism is central to political Islam, as 
grassroots networks help to structure support and advance the vision of an Islamic 
society. Even if many grassroots activists, for principled or pragmatic reasons, eschew 
politics, their activism plays a role in crystallising a devout bourgeoisie that represents 
an important constituency for Islamist parties. Most Islamist political actors began 
their careers as grassroots activists. Although a turn towards political activism does 
not normally signify a rejection of grassroots activism, movements choosing this path 
become more susceptible to competition from and criticism by other Islamist 
organisations focusing solely on the grassroots level. 
The decades since the 1970s have seen the rise in many Arab countries of 
Salafism as a grassroots religious movement. This ultra-conservative form of religious 
piety influenced by Wahhabism and focusing on societal issues has commonly pushed 
Salafi actors to ‘fill a void’ left by weak or retreating states, and they have often been 
supported by regimes for precisely this purpose. From the perspective of regimes, 
Salafis have had the distinct advantage of being avowedly apolitical and, indeed, 
direct rivals to the Muslim Brotherhood and other political Islamists. In many Arab 
states the regime’s sponsorship of Salafi groups represented a form of dividing and 
ruling over the Islamist movement as a whole. These intra-Islamist schisms have also 
become more pronounced following the uprisings in many Arab states. 
 6 
The extent and nature of repression in each state affected the ability of Islamist 
political activists to connect with and mobilise broader publics. In Egypt, particularly 
from the mid-1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood represented a high-risk vehicle for 
political and religious expression due to frequent regime clampdowns on the 
movement. As such, grassroots activism by Salafi organisations offered a safer 
alternative. Although often passing under the radar at the time, these quietist 
strategies and dynamics help explain the sudden surge of Salafi activism following 
the uprisings. Salafism exists in particular as a significant trend among the poorer and 
marginalised strata of society (muhammishin), and can pose a challenge to the 
moderation and institutionalisation of Islamist groups by diluting support for formal 
politics.  
The rise of Salafism should also be understood in the context of broader 
regional shifts, particularly the rise of Saudi and Wahhabi economic and ideological 
power. But recognition of these regional dynamics should not lead to the conclusion 
that all Salafis are alike or are externally controlled. Doctrinal and strategic 
differences exist, and Salafis are often as rooted locally as they are committed to a 
transnational, ‘deterritorialised’ vision of conservative Islamic rule. The Arab 
uprisings have demonstrated that fissures exist inside the Salafi sphere in different 
states and that Salafi actors are as capable of devising flexible and pragmatic 
strategies as others, including opting for political engagement following the fall of the 
old regimes. 
 
Violent Islamist activism 
 
Islamist advocates of the establishment of an Islamic order through the use of force 
have been a persistent and noticeable trend in Arab politics at least since the 1970s. 
Whether they are primarily endorsing the use of violence under the guise of a defence 
of an idealised Islamic community on ideological/theological grounds, or whether 
they turn to armed jihad as a pragmatic response to the attempts by the state to repress 
other forms of Islamic activism, they have become a major factor shaping the political 
landscape of the region. In addition, since the turn of the century, an increasingly 
prominent aspect of jihadi activism has been its transnational/global character.  
By the start of the Arab uprisings, all the countries considered in this report 
had experienced political violence led by such jihadi movements, from the extensive 
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challenges of the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda in the 2000s, to the episodic challenges 
of jihadi groups based in Egypt and Libya in the 1990s, and the occasional small-scale 
flare up of transnational violence in Tunisia. Whilst the mass uprisings witnessed in 
the region in 2011 did not involve in any significant way the jihadi organisations, and 
the fall of much despised authoritarian regimes to democratic protests undermined 
traditional jihadi rhetoric blaming ‘apostates’ and ‘infidels’, the aftermath of the 
uprisings provided new opportunities for them. The diminished state capabilities of 
the new post-uprising regimes, particularly in relation to the use of the repressive 
apparatus, enabled the jihadi groups/jihadists to operate with fewer constraints.   
The entrenchment of domestic conflicts in Libya and Yemen (as well as the 
transnational implications of the Syrian conflict and the precarious situation in Iraq), 
have enabled jihadists to increase their military capabilities and strengthen their 
regional networks. While the process of democratisation of the countries of the Arab 
uprisings might have durably weakened the revolutionist Islamist agenda of the 
jihadists, the practical failings of the new political elites in establishing a functioning 
democratic order often ensured that this opportunity did not become reality.  Instead, 
events like the return to power of secular autocrats in Egypt and the ensuing 
crackdown on Islamist political activism reaffirmed the continuing relevance of 
earlier jihadi discourses and legitimation of violence against such authoritarian 
regimes and their allies at home and abroad. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the last few decades in the Arab world, as there were no effective political 
mechanisms for mediating between different societal interests, competition was 
expressed via a cultural and religious prism.  These socio-cultural differences, and the 
way they are instrumentalised by the state, are thus essential to understanding both the 
salience of Islamist politics in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, and the differences 
between the discourses and practices of Islamism across the region. A Salafi in 
Tunisia, for example, is not the same as a Salafi in Yemen. These categories of 
Islamism are always evolving, and whilst we can identify some rather stable longer-
term trajectories, it is also crucial to realise that a changing political context, and 
notably regime change, can reshape significantly Islamist identities and strategies. 
The Arab uprisings have initiated such a re-articulation of Islamism in different 
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countries, and the significance of this transformation is directly linked to the nature 
and intensity of the changes in the overall political system.  
 
This report thus addresses political Islam at a critical juncture. Any policy-relevant 
assessment of the state of political Islam in the Arab transition states has to address 
the following four main issues: 
 
1. To present the dynamics of each country without invoking an over-simplistic 
totalising discourse on Islamism  
2. To evaluate the intensity and characteristics of the conflict between Islamists 
and secularists in each state 
3. To detail what role Islamist groups can still play in the process of 
democratisation 
4. To differentiate between the dynamics of political, grassroots and violent 
Islamist trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
